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Abstract
We investigate an agent-based model of opinion dynamics with two types of social response:
conformity and independence. Conformity is introduced to the model analogously as in
the Sznajd model or q-voter model, which means that only unanimous group exerts peer
pressure on individuals. The novelty, in relation to previous versions of the q-voter model,
is memory possessed by each agent and external noise T , which plays the role of social tem-
perature. Each agent has its own memories of past experiences related to the social costs
and benefits of being independent or conformist. If an agent was awarded in past more for
being independent, it will have a greater tendency to be independent than conformist and
vice versa. We will show that depending on the social temperature T the system sponta-
neously organizes into one of two regimes. Below a certain critical social temperature Tc, all
agents in the society acquire personal traits (so called person state). Some of them become
permanent conformists and others start to behave forever independently. This means that
initially homogeneous population becomes heterogeneous, and agents respond differently to
social influence. For T > Tc, all agents with equal probabilities behave independently or
conform to peer pressure (so called situation state). This regime change between person and
situation state, which reminds the idea of an annealed vs. quenched disorder, affects also
public opinion. Particularly interesting results are obtained for individualistic societies, in
which public opinion is non-monotonic function of T , which means that there is an optimal
social temperature for which an agreement in the society is the highest.
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1. Introduction
As written by Daniel Kahneman in the article based on his Nobel Prize lecture: “A
theory of choice that completely ignores feelings such as the pain of losses and the regret
of mistakes is not just descriptively unrealistic. It also leads to prescriptions that do not
maximize the utility of outcomes as they are actually experienced (...).” [1]. This means
that individual’s memories influence judgments and choices that people make. Yet, most
of opinion dynamics models, which can be treated as a zero-level approach to various more
complex social processes like political voting, marketing choices, diffusion of innovation,
etc., initially did not include memory on the microscopic level. This applies in particular to
binary-opinion models, such as: the voter model (VM) [2, 3], models of social impact [4, 5],
the Galam (majority) model [6–8], the Sznajd model [9, 10], the threshold model [11], or
the q-voter model [12].
Due to our knowledge, the idea of memory was introduced for the first time into the
voter model by Dall’Asta and Castellano to reduce the noise of VM, which resulted in
the appearance of an effective surface tension [13]. They endowed each i-th voter with a
pair of counters: C+i for being in a state ’+’ and C
−
i for being in a state ’−’. At each
time step the corresponding counter was updated, and a voter could change its state only
when the counter reached a given threshold value. The similar idea was used later in the
model describing consumer decisions regarding switching to dynamic electricity tariffs [14].
However, in the latter paper only one counter was introduced to measure for how many steps
the same state (opinion) is kept, which reflected the assumption that decision is based on
the unanimity of past opinions. Since 2007, the concept of memory has been incorporated
into the voter model in several ways [3]. However, all proposed approaches included one
or another waiting time for the opinion change [15–17]. For example, Stark et al. studied
the effect of a memory-dependent transition rate in the voter model assuming that the flip
rate decreases with the time the voter has been in its current state [15]. Xiong et al. have
assumed that an individual inclination increases with the number of times the voter has
held its most frequent opinion in the past interactions [16]. Different idea of memory has
been proposed by Takaguchi and Masuda, who endowed links, instead of voters, between
the nodes with a random variable, which represented the time until the initial update event
occurs on this link [17]. Zhong et al. have introduced a generalized voter model with time-
decaying rate of the influence of peer pressure, which incorporates a multilayer network and
memory of past influences [18].
Recently, another idea of memory has been introduced into the voter model by Woolcock
et al. [19]. They studied a heterogeneous voter model in which each agent was endowed with
the fitness parameter. During pairwise interactions agents’ fitnesses are compared, and with
probability p the agent with the lower fitness adopts the opinion of the one with the higher
value, whereas with complementary probability the opposite happens. The winning agent
(the one that keeps its opinion) increases its fitness. This idea reminds a lot of the Bonabeau
model, in which agents also fight when they meet. Each fight influences the agent’s power:
a winner becomes stronger, and a looser becomes weaker, what alters the probabilities of
winning their future fights [20, 21].
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In this work, we propose to introduce memory into opinion dynamics in yet another way
inspired by a paper on random walkers with extreme value memory [22]. We will study
the q-voter model, which has occurred to be particularly interesting from theoretical and
applicative point of view [12, 23–33]. We will focus on the q-voter model with independence,
introduced in [34]. This version of the model occurred to be particularly useful in modeling
diffusion of eco-innovations [14, 35–37]. Until now the level of independence p was an external
parameter of the model, and two different approaches have been used: person and situation-
oriented [33, 38]. Within the situation-oriented approach the system is homogeneous, and
each of N agents can behave independently with probability p and conform to the group
with complementary probability 1 − p. On the other hand, within the person-oriented
approach pN agents are permanently independent, and (1−p)N of them always conform to
the source of influence. In this paper we will show that without assuming a priori person-
oriented approach and setting particular value of parameter p, we can obtain two regimes
(situation or person state) depending on the external noise T , which can be interpreted as
the social temperature [39, 40]. For low T , the system will self-organize from the situation
state, in which the population is homogeneous, to the state in which agents acquire personal
traits. This self-organization will appear as a result of bad and good memories related to
the type of social response.
There are many social benefits of conformity, like sense of security, fraternity, or conve-
nience. It is easier to cooperate with people that follow social norms. On the other hand, we
often think of conformity as a bad thing, meaning that people who conform are weak and
dependent. Especially in western individualistic cultures, the word “conformity” tends to
carry a negative value judgment. Moreover, there are many examples that conformity can
lead to disaster (e.g., suicides, fraternity hazing, sexual assault). Nevertheless, conformity
can also be used for many worthwhile purposes like stimulating pro-ecological or anti-racist
behavior [41]. Therefore, the question “is conformity good or bad?” has no scientific an-
swer. Assuming the values most of us share, we can say that conformity is at times bad (e.g.,
when it leads someone to drive drunk), at times good (e.g., when it inhibits people from
cutting into a theater line), and at times inconsequential (when it disposes tennis players
to wear white) [42]. Assumption that we make in this paper is that all these bad and good
experiences related to the individual’s behavior, conformist or independent, are collected
in personal memory and influence somehow future behavior. So, if someone gained more
benefits from being independent in the past, he will more likely behave independently in the
future and vice versa. This means that we do not assume a priori that agents have person-
alities. At the beginning the system is homogeneous, i.e., all agents are the same. However,
as the time goes, their individual situational experiences may lead to heterogeneity.
To build the model based on the above assumption we need to know how person’s
memories of the past may influence their decisions about the future. The issue how memory
impacts various decisions has been investigated in a number of psychological experiments
related to political voting [43], evaluations of pleasurable experiences [44], or episodes of pain
[45, 46]. For example, it has been shown empirically that patients’ memories of the past may
influence their decisions about the future medical treatment, yet memories are imperfect and
susceptible to bias. In particular, the duration of the episode of pain has relatively little
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effect on subsequent evaluations, whereas the worst part of the experience and the amount
of pain just before the episode ends are weighted heavily in the final impression. This
observation, known presently under the name peak-end rule, has been recently applied to a
random walk model where the probability of moving left or right depends on the maximum
value of a random variable associated with each time step [22]. Here, we will use the same
idea to model how agents decide to behave, independently or conform to social norms.
2. Model description
We consider a system composed of N mutually connected agents so that each agent is a
neighbor of everyone else. Such a structure corresponds to a social network represented by a
complete graph where each node is associated with one agent, and links indicate possible in-
teractions between individuals. Networks like this one are frequently used to model relations
in small groups or cliques where everybody knows each other [36, 47]. In order to mimic
interactions in larger societies where the social structure is more complicated, complex net-
works are embraced, and they form a framework for agent-based models [25, 32, 48]. An
agent in i-th vertex is characterized by a two-state variable si = ±1, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, which
can be interpreted as a binary opinion on a given issue, e.g., an agent agrees or disagrees
with something. Of course, the interpretation depends strictly on a phenomenon that is
modeled. Since the variable si takes only two values just like a spin in the famous Ising
model, agents are often called spins. Herein, we will use terms agent, spin, voter, individual
interchangeably. Agents in the system are subjected to two types of interactions that may
change their opinions. From a psychological point of view, these factors are recognized as
two different responses to social pressure: conformity and independence [49]. The first one
tends to order the system whereas the second one tries to disturb it and thus is regarded as
stochastic noise. In the model, a random sequential updating scheme is used. Therefore, at
each elementary time step, we choose randomly one agent that can reconsider its opinion.
Additionally, we choose at random a group of influence comprised of q its nearest neighbors.
The group is called q-panel, and it attempts to impact upon a state of the chosen agent.
With probability 1− p, the agent behaves as a conformist, and it yields to the group pres-
sure by taking the same opinion of the panel each time when the group is unanimous – all q
individuals are in the same state. Otherwise, when there is no consensus in the panel, noth-
ing happens, and the state of the chosen agent remains unchanged. With complementary
probability p, the agent acts independently of its neighbors. It decides by its own whether to
change its opinion, so with the probability 1/2, the agent’s state is changed to the opposite
one.
In the previous studies, the parameter p, which controls the level of independence in the
system, did not change in time. It was considered as an external parameter established at
the beginning of the simulation so that all agents were equally likely to be independent in
a given time step. Such an approach is called situation-oriented one because the agent’s
behavior (i.g., acting as a conformist or as an independent individual) may change from one
time step to other during the simulation [34, 50]. Such a probabilistic situational approach
has been used already earlier within the Galam’s majority model with contrarians[51, 52].
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From physical point of view, one can also think of these fluctuations in agents’ attitude as
the annealed disorder introduced to the system. A competitive approach named person-
oriented one has been studied, as well. It assumes that the behavior of agents arises from
their personal traits, therefore, it does not evolve in time. So at the beginning of the
simulation, a fraction p of all individuals are set to always act independently, and the rest
of agents are always conformists [33, 38]. This approach, on the other hand, can be related
to the quenched disorder since the behavior of agents is frozen in time. As it turned out,
there are qualitative differences between these two approaches applied to the q-voter model
with independence described above – discontinuous phase transitions are present only in the
situation-oriented model [33]. Moreover, within the quenched approach the critical value of
independence, below which an ordered phase with the majority-minority broken symmetry is
observed, increases with the size of the influence group q. The same result has been obtained
also for the q-voter model with anticonformity [34] and the Galam’s majority model with
contrarians [51, 52]. In the annealed version of the q-voter model with independence the
opposite relation is observed – the critical value of independence decreases with the size of
the influence group q.
In this work, on the other hand, p is an internal parameter, which is not fixed and
can alter in time depending on the past experiences of a given agent. In particular, we
incorporate the idea of the extreme value memory [22] into the q-voter model. With each
time step, we associate a random variable Ut that represents the utility, i.e., the amount of
satisfaction that an agent receives from its choice. We assume that these random variables
Ut are independent and identically distributed for different times. Now, agents remember
the maximum value of Ut for all their independent behaviors U
I and separately for all their
conformist behaviors UC . The next choice of their attitude is established based on these
remembered maximum utilities in such a way that more probable is the behavior from which
we had the most satisfaction in the past. Therefore, we choose the level of independence
p to be given by a logistic function commonly used in discrete choice models in economics.
For specific values of random variates uI and uC, outcomes of random variables U I and UC ,
the level of independence can be computed by the following formula:
p =
eu
I/T
euI/T + euC/T
, (1)
where T is a positive external parameter, and it represents the noise level in the decision
making process. The maximum utilities U I and UC at the time t are given by
U I = max
0<j<t
{uI0, Uj : an agent is independent at j-th step}, (2)
UC = max
0<j<t
{uC0 , Uj : an agent is a conformist at j-th step}, (3)
where uI0 and u
C
0 are the initial values of the utilities assigned to all agents. Note that when
uI0 = u
C
0 , the level of independence p is equal to 1/2 at the beginning of simulation, and
initially, there is no bias in the attitude of agents, see Fig. 1. Additionally, the relation
between p and the noise level, that is, Eq. (1) is exemplified in Fig. 1 for three different pairs
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Figure 1: (a) Levels of independence p as functions of the noise strength T for different fixed values of the
utilities (uI ;uC). (b) Time evolution of the average levels of independence in the system of the size N = 106.
The initial utilities are as follows: uI
0
= 0.4 and uC
0
= 0. Markers represent the outcome of Monte Carlo
simulations and are connected just to guide the eye. Each line refers to a different value of T . The noise
increases from the top to the bottom. Note that the final values of 〈p〉 depend on the noise level, in contrast
to the case with the same initial utilities where 〈p〉 = 0.5 independently of the noise.
of utilities. We should emphasize that p not only changes in time, but also it differs from
agent to agent since its value depends on the history of the specific individual.
In general, Ut can come from any distribution. However, throughout the work, we use
an exponentially distributed random variable with parameter λ > 0. Thus, the probability
density function of Ut has the following form:
fUt(u) = 1{u≥0}λe
−λu, (4)
where 1{u≥0} is the indicator function defined on the interval [0,∞). This particular choice
of a distribution is motivated by the emergence of an interesting transition between two
stable states of the system [22], which is described in the next section.
The algorithm of a simulation is following:
1. Initialize the simulation (t = 0): choose an initial concentration of up-spins c(0), then
assign an initial opinion to each agent – for all vertices numbered by i ∈ {1, ..., N}
draw a random number ri from a uniform distribution supported on the interval [0, 1].
If ri < c(0), set si(0) = 1. Otherwise, set si(0) = −1. Select any two real numbers
as the initial values of utilities uI0 and u
C
0 . Note that all agents have the same initial
values.
2. Set t = t+∆t, and choose randomly i-th agent from the system.
3. Draw two random numbers r and ut, the first from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
and the second from the utility distribution given by Eq. (4).
4. Calculate p for the chosen agent based on its extreme value memory from Eq. (1).
5. If r < p, the agent acts independently – flip the spin with probability 1/2. Relate ut
with independence; go to 2.
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6. If r ≥ p, the agent acts as a conformist – choose randomly a group of q distinct
neighbors of the chosen i-th agent: n1, n2, ..., nq ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. If all q agents are in
the same state, the chosen agent takes the same opinion as the group. Relate ut with
conformity; go to 2.
As usual, one Monte Carlo step (MCS) corresponds to N elementary time steps ∆t = 1/N .
3. Results
In Ref. [22], a similar decision making mechanism was applied to a single, one-dimensional
random walker that based on his past experiences had to choose the direction of its next step.
It turns out that the long-time walker’s behavior is dependent on the utility distribution.
In particular, when Ut comes from an exponential distribution with parameter λ, there is a
transition at
T = Tc =
1
λ
(5)
between a stable state in which the walker is frozen into the motion along one direction, this
happens for λT < 1, and a stable state in which it samples both directions roughly equally
for λT > 1. In terms of our model, the motion in one direction would correspond to an agent
that does not change its behavior, i.e., it is permanently a conformist or an independent
individual. On the other hand, the state with the equal sampling of both directions would
refer to an agent that constantly changes its attitude from being independent to being a
conformist. In fact, these states may be thought of as two separate regimes with quenched
(person-oriented approach) and annealed disorders (situation-oriented approach) [33, 38].
Now, the question arises whether the same transition will be observed in the system of
interacting agents defined in the previous section, and how memory will impact the collective
behavior of the system. In order to bring answers to the above issues, we carry out Monte
Carlo simulations of the q-voter model with independence and the extreme value memory
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Figure 2: Normalized histograms of the independence level p in the system comprised of N = 106 agents
after 103 MCS for the same initial utilities uI
0
= uC
0
= 0 at five different noise levels increasing from the
left to the right. The group of influence contains q = 4 agents. Note that although the distribution changes
with T , it stays symmetric all the time. Moreover, the average value of independence in the system 〈p〉 is
not affected by the noise. It remains unchanged for different T and equals 〈p〉 = 0.5.
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where the utilities are drawn from the exponential distribution with λ = 1. In our model,
the level of independence p is responsible for the behavior of agents. Since p is the property
of every individual, we can examine the distribution of this feature in the system. Figure 2
presents the empirical density function f(p) of the independence level after 103 Monte Carlo
steps for the system comprised of N = 106 agents for several values of T . In this case, the
initial utility values are set to zero, i.e., uI0 = u
C
0 = 0. Indeed, when T is low, agents quickly
promote one attitude over the other, and similarly as the walker became frozen into the
motion along one direction, our agents become frozen into one type of behavior. Moreover,
we can see from Fig. 2 that approximately half of all agents are constantly independent,
that is, their p is close to 1, and the other half are conformists since their p is close to 0.
On the other hand, when T is high, the distribution of p concentrates around the value
p = 0.5, so agents constantly change their behavior from one time step to the other. On
average, half of their choices involve conformity and the other half independence; see the
right panel of Fig. 2. Similar symmetric functions f(p) are obtain for the initial utilities
that are different from 0 but of the same value, i.e., uI0 = u
C
0 . In all these cases, the average
value of independence 〈p〉 in the system is not influenced by the noise, and it remains at
the same level 〈p〉 = 0.5 for different T . In contrast, when uI0 , u
C
0 , the distribution of the
level of independence becomes skewed for low values of T , and only strong noise makes it
symmetric, as we can see from Fig. 3. Moreover, now the average value of independence in
the system relies on T , see Fig. 1.
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Figure 3: Normalized histograms of the independence level p in the system comprised of N = 106 agents
with the bias in the initial values of utilities at five different noise levels increasing from the first column on
the left to the last column on the right. The top row corresponds to the following initial values uI
0
= 0.4
and uC0 = 0 while the bottom row refers to the values u
I
0 = 0 and u
C
0 = 0.4. The data are collected after
103 Monte Carlo steps.
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In general, we can obtain diverse stationary probability density functions of the level of
independence. The shape of them depends on the initial values of utilities and the level of
noise T . Although we are not able to derive strictly the formula for f(p), let us assume
that we already know the form of this density function. In that case, we can calculate the
stationary value of the up-spin concentration in the system defined as a fraction of agents
with a positive opinion, i.e., si = 1. If there are N↑ agents with si = 1 in a given time step,
the up-spin concentration is as follows
c =
N↑
N
. (6)
In every elementary time step, the total number of agents with a positive opinion may
increase by one, decrease by one, or remain at the same level since we use a random sequential
updating. This corresponds to the following transition rates:
γ+ = P
(
c→ c +
1
N
)
,
γ− = P
(
c→ c−
1
N
)
,
(7)
so that the time evolution of the concentration is given by the rate equation
∂c
∂t
= γ+ − γ−, (8)
in the limit of N → ∞. Note that for the stationary value of the up-spin concentration,
Eq. (8) gives γ+ = γ−. Similarly, in the quenched region, the concentration of up-spins only
among agents with the independence level in the range (p, p + dp) can be introduced. We
use the following notation cp to denote such defined quantity:
cp =
N↑p
Np
, (9)
where Np is the number of agents with the specific independence level, and N
↑
p indicates how
many of them have a positive opinion. Now, thanks to the above partition, we can write
down explicitly the transition rates γ+p , γ
−
p for all values of independence, and consequently,
find the stationary levels of the concentrations cp. Based on the model description and the
mean-field approximation [23, 50], the transition rates have the following forms:
γ+p = (1− cp)
[
(1− p)cq +
p
2
]
,
γ−p = cp
[
(1− p)(1− c)q +
p
2
]
.
(10)
By equalizing the above equations, we obtain the stationary concentration of agents with a
positive opinion and with the level of independence close to p:
cp =
(1− p)cq + p
2
(1− p) [cq + (1− c)q] + p
. (11)
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Having cp, we are able to determine the overall up-spin concentration in the quenched case
by solving the following self-consistent equation
c =
∫ ∞
−∞
cpf(p)dp. (12)
In the quenched region, since the probability density function f(p) concentrates around
points 0 and 1, as seen in Figs. 2 and 3, it can be approximated by a discrete distribution
represented as a sum of two Dirac delta functions at these points with certain masses p¯ and
1− p¯ accordingly:
f(p) = p¯δ(p− 1) + (1− p¯)δ(p), (13)
where p¯ corresponds to the average level of independence in the system because
〈p〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
pf(p)dp = p¯. (14)
Note that p¯ can be also interpreted as a fraction of independent individuals in the quenched
system. For p¯ = 0.5, we get the symmetric distribution which is obtain when the initial
utilities are equal uI0 = u
C
0 . In contrast, if at the beginning the utilities are not equal and
uI0 < u
C
0 , then we have p¯ < 0.5. The opposite situation takes place for u
I
0 > u
C
0 ; see the first
column of Fig. 3. Now, let us perform the integration in Eq. (12) after inserting Eqs. (11)
and (13) into it. The following implicit expression is obtained for the stationary up-spin
concentration at low noise values T where we can approximate f(p) by two Dirac delta
functions Eq. (13):
c =
1
2
p¯+
cq
cq + (1− c)q
(1− p¯). (15)
Figure 4 illustrates graphically the above dependency for a few values of q. Continuous and
dashed lines refer to stable and unstable states accordingly. Now, if we knew the connection
between the average independence p¯, the initial utilities uI0 and u
C
0 , and the noise level T ,
we would read from Fig. 4 or directly from Eq. (15) the stationary value of the up-spin
concentration for these parameters in the quenched regime, i.e., for small T . In general, this
relation is unidentified, however, we already know that 〈p〉 = 0.5 for all values of T for the
special case when uI0 = u
C
0 . Thus, when the initial utilities are the same, in order to establish
the stationary concentrations for small noises, we look at Fig. 4 and the intersections of solid
lines representing the stable solutions of Eq. (15) with the dotted vertical line at p¯ = 0.5.
We see that there are only two such intersections. Moreover, we expect that q should not
influence much the level of the stationary up-spin concentration in the quenched area since
changing q does not shift a lot the intersection points.
In the asymmetric case, that is to say, when uI0 , u
C
0 , the situation is different. As
seen in Fig. 3, we start from the skewed distribution, i.e., p¯ , 0.5 for small T , but along
with the increasing level of noise, f(p) becomes more symmetric, and p¯ approaches 0.5. Of
course, this happens only to some extent since for higher T , Eq. (13) does not approximate
well the real distribution. The direction from which we approach this point depends on the
initial utilities and is illustrated by an arrow in Fig. 4. If uI0 < u
C
0 , the average value of
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Figure 4: Phase diagrams for the q-voter model in the (a) quenched and (b) annealed approaches. Gray
lines indicate the stationary values of the up-spin concentration given by Eqs. (15) and (17), continuous
and dashed ones refer to stable and unstable states accordingly. (a) For the quenched case, when the initial
utilities are equal, we have p¯ = 0.5 (dotted vertical line) for all T . Lower values of the average level of
independence are related to the situation in which uI0 < u
C
0 . Higher values, on the other hand, correspond
to the following utilities uI
0
> uC
0
. For these assymetric initial conditions, arrows illustrate how p¯ will change
when we increase the noise T in the system. (b) For the annealed case, the average level of independence
in the system amounts to p¯ = 0.5 (dotted vertical line), and the only stable value of the stationary up-spin
concentration is c = 0.5. Note that for the annealed case, p¯ corresponds to the probability of an agent being
independent in a given time step whereas for the quenched one, p¯ refers to the fraction of agents in the
system that are independent all the time.
independence will increase to p¯ = 0.5. On the other hand, when uI0 > u
C
0 , it will decrease
to that value. Therefore, raising the level of noise should decrease the order for uI0 < u
C
0 ,
that it, the stationary values of the up-spin concentration tend towards a disordered phase
c = 0.5, and at the same time, increase it for uI0 > u
C
0 ; see Fig. 4. Particularly interesting
is the second case because greater noise boosts strength of ordering in the system, which is
untypical.
In the annealed region, the probability density function f(p) concentrates around one
point p¯; see Figs. 2 and 3. Therefore, it can be approximated by a single Dirac delta function
at this point:
f(p) = δ(p− p¯). (16)
Once again p¯ refers to the average level of independence in the system. We know that in
our case p¯ = 0.5, but we can consider more general one. Such annealed version of the
q-voter model was already considered in [34], and the stationary up-spin concentration has
the following form in this case:
c =
(1− p¯)cq + p¯
2
(1− p¯) [cq + (1− c)q] + p¯
. (17)
We present the above dependency in Fig. 4 for different values of q. As seen, the only
stationary value of the up-spin concentration that can be attained for p¯ = 0.5 is c = 0.5. It
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Figure 5: Phase diagrams for the q-voter model with extreme value memory and exponentially distributed
utilities with parameter λ = 1. Initially, all spins are up, so c(0) = 1. Dots represent the outcome of Monte
Carlo simulations of the system containing N = 104 agents. The results are averaged over 102 runs and
collected after 103 MCS. Dotted lines are drawn just to guide the eye. (a) The model with no bias in the
initial values of the utilities, i.e., uI
0
= uC
0
= 0 for different q-panel sizes. (b) The model with the group of
influence comprised of q = 4 agents and different initial conditions for the utilities (uI
0
;uC
0
).
means that for large values of T , in the annealed regime, our system is disordered.
Our theoretical predictions agree with the Monte Carlo simulations of the system. The
stationary value of the up-spin concentration as a function of the noise level T is presented
in Fig. 5 for the initial value of the up-spin concentration c(0) = 1. Phase diagrams in the
left panel correspond to the model with the same initial values of both utilities uI0 = u
C
0 = 0
but different sizes of the group of influence. In the right panel, on the other hand, we see
how the results change if we introduce a bias in these initial conditions for the fixed group
size q = 4. For the cases where uI0 = u
C
0 , a transition between an ordered phase at low
noise levels and a disordered phase at high noise levels is observed. Moreover, the number
of agents in the q-panel does not affect much the up-spin concentration in the quenched
regime, i.e., in the region where the noise T is sufficiently small. When uI0 , u
C
0 depending
on which utility is greater, we can control the value of the up-spin concentration for small
T . For uI0 < u
C
0 , the concentration of agents with a positive opinion decreases along with
the increasing noise. For the opposite case, when uI0 > u
C
0 , we have very different situation.
Initially, the concentration unusually rises with the rising level of noise but only to some
point after which it starts decreasing. As predicted, the first phase is connected with the
quenched regime where bigger noise makes the bimodal distribution of p more symmetric,
then c rises. Nonetheless, for large enough T the distribution eventually changes its shape
to unimodal in the annealed area, and c decreases.
4. Conclusions
Which of these two approaches, situation-oriented or person-oriented, is more reasonable?
The answer for this question was the subject of a long-term person-situation debate [53].
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Particularly illustrative metaphor related to this issue has been given by one of the most
creative social psychologists Richard E. Nisbett, who claims that behavior can be predicted
much better from the social setting than from personality traits [54]. However, the metaphor
that he used, as well as modern personality psychology suggest that both approaches are
reasonable depending on the investigated problem. Let us quote here Nisbett’s metaphor
that was aimed to convince people why believing that personal traits can predict individual’s
behavior is naive and reminds ancient beliefs about physical world: “(...) in ancient physics,
the behavior of objects was understood exclusively in terms of the object itself: A stone sinks
when placed in water because it has the property of “gravity”; a piece of woods floats because it
has the property of “levity”. In modern physics, in contrast, an understanding of the behavior
of objects requires simultaneous specification of the environmental forces, the properties of the
object, and the relation between the environmental forces and the properties of the object.”.
As physicists we know that a stone and a piece of wood indeed fall differently in water
because of their individual traits, such as density of the material and the size of an object.
However, in the air these differences will be less visible, and in vacuum both objects will
fall identically. Such a metaphor may seem too far reaching, yet social psychologists have
shown that often situation may completely overcome personality [41, 42, 54]. However, it
all depends on the external conditions.
In this paper we have shown that indeed, depending on the external factor related to
social temperature T , we can observe one of two types of behavior: person or situation-
oriented. We have developed the q-voter model with independence incorporating the idea
of memory in the spirit of extreme value memory [22]. Initially the system is homogeneous,
which means that all agents have the same tendencies uI0 for being independent and u
C
0 for
being conformists. However, due to the memories of the past experiences related to each
type of social response they may acquire personal traits if the level of social temperature
is below a critical value. We may relate the ratio between uI0 and u
C
0 to one of the most
important Hofstede’s cultural dimensions[55], namely individualism vs. collectivism (IDV).
Particularly interesting relation between public opinion and social temperature T has been
found for the initially individualistic societies (uI0 > u
C
0 ). It occurs that in such a society
there is an optimal T at which the agreement in the society is the highest. For low T ,
there is complete disagreement, i.e., the number of positive and negative opinions is the
same (c = 1/2). Above certain threshold a majority opinion appears c , 1/2 and above
the critical social temperature Tc it again decreases to c = 1/2 (stale-mate situation). For
initially collective societies (uI0 < u
C
0 ) the agreement in the society decreases monotonically
and reaches stale-mate situation above the critical social temperature Tc.
Spontaneous appearance of heterogeneity related to different types of social response,
rational and inflexible, has been observed already in [56]. They have combined the Galam
unifying frame (GUF) [57] with the CODA formalism proposed by Martins [58], in which
each agent is described by two variables: continuous private opinion and related discrete
choice. In CODA model an individual’s continuous opinion was used to measure how certain
each agent was about its decision, and therefore, inflexibility could naturally occurred as a
consequence of very strong private opinion. In our model agents are described by a single
binary variable, and the heterogeneity appears as a consequence of past experiences related
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to the type of behavior, analogously as in [22].
The extreme value memory is certainly not the only possibility to incorporate the idea
of memory into the q-voter model although particularly interesting because of the empirical
justification laying below the assumption as well as interesting outcome, which can be also
nicely interpreted in terms of social psychology. However, it would be worth checking out
how other types of memory would influence the opinion formation under the q-voter model,
and we believe that this is an interesting task for the future studies.
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